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23andEveryone
PRIVACY CONCERNS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT’S
USE OF GENEALOGY DATABASES TO IMPLICATE
RELATIVES IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
“DNA testing[ ] [has an] ‘unparalleled ability both to
exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty. It has
the potential to significantly improve both the criminal justice
system and police investigative practices.’”1
INTRODUCTION
On November 18, 1987, twenty-year-old Jay Cook and
eighteen-year-old Tanya Van Cuylenborg, a young couple from
British Columbia, drove to Washington State for an overnight ferry
trip to Seattle.2 Six days later, Van Cuylenborg’s body was found in
a ditch. She had been shot in the back of the head, bound with zip
ties, and sexually assaulted.3 Two days after the discovery of Van
Cuylenborg’s body, and fifty miles away, Cook’s strangled and
beaten body was found wrapped in a blanket.4 Zip ties were also
found near Cook’s body.5 While police received over three hundred
tips of potential suspects in the aftermath of the crime, they never
made an arrest.6 Investigators uploaded the DNA profile developed
1 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 442 (2013) (quoting Dist. Atty’s Office for
Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009)).
2 Heather Murphy, Technique Used to Find Golden State Killer Leads to a
Suspect in 1987 Murders, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/05/18/science/ancestry-site-arrest-washington.html [https://perma.cc/QKN6-NN
PJ] [hereinafter Murphy, Technique Used].
3 Caleb Hutton & Rikki King, Suspect Arrested in 1987 Deaths of Young
Couple from BC, HERALDNET (May 18, 2018), https://www.heraldnet.com/news/suspectarrested-in-1987-deaths-of-young-couple-from-bc/ [https://perma.cc/E8X4-SXJD]; see
Eric Stevick, Local Cold Case Helps ‘60 Minutes’ Explain Genetic Genealogy, HERALDNET
(Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.heraldnet.com/news/local-cold-case-helps-60-minutesexplain-genetic-genealogy/ [https://perma.cc/LDK7-AXC6].
4 Peter Aldhous, A Double Murder from 1987 Was Just Solved Thanks to the
Genealogy Website Used for the Golden State Killer, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 18, 2018),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/cook-van-cuylenborg-murder-DNAgenealogy [https://perma.cc/HM5W-ZQRT].
5 Hutton & King, supra note 3.
6 Meagan Flynn, A Genealogy Website Helps Crack Another Cold Case, Police
Say, This One a 1987 Double Homicide, WASH. POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/05/21/a-genealogy-website-used-to-
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from a semen sample collected from Van Cuylenborg’s body to
CODIS, the Federal Bureau of Investigations DNA databank
system.7 No match was discovered.8
The big break in the case came three decades later, when
Snohomish County and Skagit County sheriff ’ s offices in
Washington State teamed with Parabon NanoLabs, a Virginiabased DNA technology company.9 Genetic information derived
from the semen sample was uploaded into GEDmatch, a public
genealogy site that permits people to upload their genetic
information in order to find biological relatives.10 GEDmatch
returned relatives who matched the semen sample at the “secondcousin level.”11 CeCe Moore, a genealogist working with
investigators, created a family tree “going all the way back to
great-grandparents.”12 Based on the cousins’ genetic profiles,
Moore determined their families converged through marriage and
deduced that there was only one male relative whose DNA
matched the semen found on Van Cuylenborg: William Earl
Talbott II, a fifty-five-year-old truck driver who lived north of SeaTac airport.13 Investigators confirmed Talbott’s identity by
surveilling him and developing a DNA profile from a cup he
discarded.14 Thirty years after the crime, Talbott was arrested,
convicted, and sentenced to two consecutive life terms in prison.15
The discovery of DNA typing in the 1980s transformed law
enforcement’s ability to exonerate innocent suspects, while
implicating those who are guilty, with “the power of a silent
biological witness at the crime scene.”16 This transformation,
coupled with the new trend of law enforcement’s use of genealogy
databases, has created legal issues that police officers,
crack-another-cold-case-police-say-this-one-a-1987-double-homicide/?utm_term=.bb78
d57bbb38 [https://perma.cc/56SG-YUSK].
7 See Drake Bennett & Kristen V. Brown, Your DNA Is Out There. Do You
Want Law Enforcement Using It?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 27, 2018), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-27/your-dna-is-out-there-do-you-want-lawenforcement-using-it [https://perma.cc/UAY8-BZRD]; Heather Murphy, Genealogy Sites
Have Helped Identify Suspects. Now They’ve Helped Convict One., N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/us/dna-genetic-genealogy-trial.html?smid=
nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/N5AA-TDM2].
8 Bennett & Brown, supra note 7.
9 See Flynn, supra note 6; Stevick, supra note 3.
10 Murphy, Technique Used, supra note 2.
11 Flynn, supra note 6.
12 Id.
13 Hutton & King, supra note 3.
14 Murphy, Technique Used, supra note 2.
15 Caleb Hutton, Life in Prison for 1987 Killer of Young Canadian Couple,
HERALDNET (July 25, 2019), https://www.heraldnet.com/news/life-in-prison-for-1987killer-of-young-canadian-couple/ [https://perma.cc/54K7-8CDM].
16 JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND
GENETICS OF STR MARKERS 2 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING].
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prosecutors, genealogy companies, and policy makers are all
currently trying to navigate.17 The technological advancement
comes with serious ethical and privacy concerns, including fear of
the establishment of a “genetic panopticon.”18 A general concern
exists that if a “genetic panopticon” comes to fruition, the
government can subject any arrestee and future generations of
his or her family to permanent control through genetic
surveillance.19 Those who voluntarily upload their DNA to openaccess genealogy websites, as well as their relatives, currently
suffer encroachments to their reasonable expectations of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment when investigative genealogy
searches are conducted.20 Consequently, a statutory framework is
necessary to regulate law enforcement’s use of genealogy websites
to conduct investigative searches. This framework must strike the
proper balance between law enforcement’s use of this new
technique to solve serious crimes and people’s constitutionallysafeguarded privacy rights. This note therefore proposes that
Congress regulate such searches by defining conditions that must
be met and procedures that must be followed—similar to those
enumerated in New York and Colorado’s regulations for CODISbased familial searches—before an investigative genealogy
search may be run by law enforcement.
Part I of this note provides background on DNA analysis
and forensic DNA testing, specifically focusing on the use of
DNA in criminal investigations. Part II describes how familial
searching is increasingly being used, and thus regulated, in both
the United Kingdom and the United States. In Part III, the note
examines the new trend of law enforcement’s use of genealogy
databases, such as GEDmatch, 23andme and Ancestry.com, to
17 See Sarah Zhang, The Messy Consequences of the Golden State Killer Case,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2019), https-//www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/10/geneticgenealogy-dna-database-criminal-investigations/599005/ [perma.cc/VC6H-FREC].
18 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 482 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). A
panopticon was an idea for a low-cost prison that would control inmates by allowing
watchmen to see all inmates at all times, but the inmates were unable to see the
watchmen. Thus, even though, practically, it would be impossible to constantly watch
the inmates, the idea was that panopticon inmates would always behave well because
they would never know if they were being watched or not. Kevin Underhill, Justice Scalia
and the Genetic Panopticon, FORBES (June 6, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kevinunderhill/2013/06/06/justice-scalia-and-the-genetic-panopticon/#4c9c2cd04084
[https://perma.cc/4YU3-NMPT].
19 See Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillance for All?, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2009),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/03/genetic-surveillance-for-all.html
[https://perma.cc/R9G7-V52H].
20 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan’s concurrence articulates a two-part reasonable expectation of privacy
test: first, the person must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”
and, second, objectively viewed, this expectation must “be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id.
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implicate familial relatives in criminal investigations.21 Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns, as well as general ethical
concerns of CODIS-based familial searching and investigative
genealogy searches are discussed in Part IV. Finally, Part V
proposes a statutory framework to balance the government’s
interest in public safety with individuals’ privacy rights.
I.

THE A, T, C, & G’S OF DNA

Forensic DNA testing has improved dramatically over the
past three decades; new techniques have advanced the speed of
sample processing, reduced the sample quantity necessary to
develop a DNA profile, and vastly enhanced the ability to
differentiate between individuals.22 A basic understanding of how
forensic DNA typing works and its use in criminal investigations
is helpful to grasp the privacy and policy implications of CODISbased familial searches and investigative genealogy searches.23
A.

DNA Analysis and Forensic DNA Typing

Modern forensic DNA testing is based on the fact that while
ninety-nine percent of humans share the same DNA, there are
specific locations on the human genome where significant
differences occur.24 In 1985, Dr. Alec Jeffreys first described “DNA
fingerprinting,” or what today is commonly known as DNA
profiling or DNA typing, by explaining that certain areas of
deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, contain sequences that continually
repeat next to each other.25 When conducting DNA profiling,
scientists look at these locations, which vary widely among
individuals, and count the number of times specific letters of the

21 See Kristen V. Brown, DNA Detectives Are Searching for Killers in Your
Family
Tree,
BLOOMBERG
(June
14,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-06-14/DNA-detectives-are-searchingfor-killers-in-your-family-tree [https://perma.cc/V978-FN9M].
22 BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING, supra note 16, at 3–4.
23 For more information on privacy implications of familial searching see
generally, Christi J. Guerrini et al., Should Police Have Access to Genetic Genealogy
Databases? Capturing the Golden State Killer and Other Criminals Using a
Controversial New Forensic Technique, PLOS BIOLOGY (Oct. 2, 2018), https://journals.
plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.2006906 [https://perma.cc/Y9DS-26
QU]; Erin E. Murphy, Familial DNA Searches: The Opposing Viewpoint, CRIM. JUST.,
Spring 2012, at 19; Brown, supra note 21.
24 K. K. Kidd et al., Understanding Human DNA Sequence Variation, 95 J.
HEREDITY 406, 407–08 (2004); Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA
Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309, 314 (2010).
25 BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING, supra note 16, at 2.
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DNA “alphabet”—A, T, G, and C—repeat at these positions.26
These letter combinations are called “short tandem repeats” or
“STRs.”27 The number of STRs donated from each parent at a
particular locus is a gene variant called an allele.28 Every person
receives half of their DNA from each biological parent, so they have
two numbers at each of these locations—one from their mother and
one from their father.29 The FBI has chosen twenty of these
particular locations or loci (singular is locus) as the “Core Loci” that
are tested to enable national database comparisons.30
Familial searching, a type of search conducted in the
database, builds on the most basic fundamentals of genetics: that
“DNA is shared among family members.”31 Because each individual
gains half of their alleles from each biological parent, there is a high
probability that biologically related individuals will share a
significant amount of STR alleles.32 Parents and children will
match at a minimum of 13 alleles, while estimates suggest that
siblings will have, on average, 16.7 alleles in common.33 This higher
rate of allele sharing among relatives is what makes familial DNA
searching a valuable investigative tool.34 With biological relatives
sharing more alleles than unrelated people, law enforcement is
able to glean information about the individual who has DNA on
file, or the databased person, and also learn about the relatives of
that individual.35 Local, state, and national DNA databanks
26 Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to
Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 250 (2006); BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA
TYPING, supra note 16, at 18–19.
27 Greely et al., supra note 26, at 249–50.
28 Id.; see Amanda Pattock, Note, It’s All Relative: Familial DNA Testing and
the Fourth Amendment, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 851, 855 (2011).
29 Pattock, supra note 28, at 854.
30 Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis [https://perma.cc/GJ7VK2YY] [hereinafter CODIS]. Effective January 1, 2017, an additional seven loci were
added to the original thirteen CODIS core loci, making the current total of CODIS core
loci twenty. The FBI decided to add an additional seven loci in order to provide increased
potential to differentiate between DNA profiles, enhance missing person investigations,
and encourage “international data sharing efforts by having more loci in common with
other countries.” Id. However, individual labs are permitted to test more locations. For
example, the NYC Office of Chief Medical Examiner tests twenty-two loci on the genome.
See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL DNA INDEX SYSTEM (NDIS) OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURES MANUAL 83 (2019), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ndis-operational-pro
cedures-manual.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/VW2U-H6FT]; N.Y.C. OFFICE OF CHIEF MED.
EXAM’R, FORENSIC BIOLOGY CODIS MANUAL 4 (2019) [hereinafter CODIS MANUAL].
31 Suter, supra note 24, at 311.
32 Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109
MICH. L. REV. 291, 295 (2010) [hereinafter Murphy, Relative Doubt].
33 Id.
34 See Emily Niedzwiecki et al., Understanding Familial DNA Searching:
Coming to a Consensus on Terminology, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. 1 (2016).
35 Anya E.R. Prince, Comprehensive Protection of Genetic Information: One
Size Privacy or Property Models May Not Fit All, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 175, 204 (2013).
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administered by the government contain millions of DNA profiles,
thus increasing the possibility of implicating a relative through a
CODIS-based familial search.36
B.

The Rise of DNA Databanks

In 1994, Congress passed the DNA Identification Act,
which authorized the FBI to establish and maintain the
Combined DNA Index System, a national DNA database known
as CODIS.37 CODIS refers to both the national DNA database
maintained by the FBI as well as the software used to manage the
database.38 The FBI has the power to establish several different
indices in which genetic profiles are stored, such as profiles of
offenders, crime scene samples, unidentified human remains, and
relatives of missing persons.39 The two most relevant indices for
the purposes of familial searching contain offender profiles and
forensic, or crime scene, profiles.40 The “Offender Index” consists
of DNA profiles collected from offenders arrested for, or convicted
of, qualifying crimes as laid out by state law.41 The “Forensic
Index” contains DNA profiles derived from crime scene evidence.42
1. CODIS and Forensic DNA Databanks
CODIS incorporates local, state, and national databases,
in which all states can upload their DNA profiles and run
searches against profiles submitted by other states and the
federal government.43 The Local DNA Index System (LDIS), used
36 See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41800, DNA TESTING IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: BACKGROUND, CURRENT LAW, GRANTS, AND ISSUES 5 (2012). Forensic
advances have increased the utility of DNA testing to allow detection of ever smaller amounts
of DNA and DNA mixtures. These advances, along with probabilistic genotyping software,
enable scientists to assign statistics to give weight to associations between individuals and
minute amounts of DNA on evidence. Laura Russell et al., A Guide to Results and Diagnostics
Within a STRmix™ Report, WIRES FORENSIC SCI. 1–2 (2019).
37 See DNA Identification Act of 1994, 34 U.S.C. § 12592 (Supp. 2017).
38 Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 32, at 296.
39 DNA Identification Act of 1994, 34 U.S.C. § 12592 (Supp. 2017).
40 Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 32, at 296.
41 FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL DNA INDEX SYSTEM (NDIS)
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL 98 (2019), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ndisoperational-procedures-manual.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/VW2U-H6FT]. Depending on
whether state law authorizes the collection of DNA from arrestees or just from convicted
offenders, states may have just a “Convicted Offender or Arrestee Index.” Frequently
Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.
fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet
[https://perma.cc/83KY-MTWZ] [hereinafter CODIS FAQs].
42 CODIS FAQs, supra note 41.
43 CODIS:
Combined DNA Index System Brochure, FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis_bro
chure [https://perma.cc/3JUB-CZ5B] [hereinafter CODIS Brochure].
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by individual laboratories, enables searches against DNA profiles
obtained from local cases and suspects who contribute genetic
material by consent, court order, or surreptitious collection.44
Additionally, each state has one laboratory that manages a State
DNA Index System (SDIS).45 SDIS allows laboratories within the
same state to run DNA profiles against one another.46 For states
to participate in the National DNA Index System (NDIS)—which
houses DNA from the contributing local, state, and federal
forensic laboratories—state legislatures must enact laws
outlining which class of offenders are required to provide DNA
samples to be uploaded to the databank.47 State laws regulating
the collection and analysis of DNA samples must be consistent
with the requirements laid out in the DNA Identification Act.48
That way, if all participating labs test the same minimum twenty
core loci, each DNA profile can be accurately compared against all
other profiles stored in CODIS.49
2. CODIS Hits and Matches
DNA profiles recovered from crime scenes are collected
and stored in the Forensic Index of CODIS and may be compared
to both offender profiles and other forensic profiles.50 The main
measure of success for CODIS is how many “hits” the system
generates.51 A hit is a “confirmed match between two or more
DNA profiles discovered by the database search.”52 There are two
main types of DNA hits: offender hits and forensic hits.53 An
offender hit occurs when a crime scene sample and an offender
44 See CODIS MANUAL, supra note 30, at 13; AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DNA EVIDENCE §§ 16-2.2–2.4, 16-1.2 cmt., at 31 (3d ed. 2007). Law
enforcement will often employ a tactic of surreptitiously surveilling a suspect in order to collect
a discarded item and develop a DNA sample. Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable
Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 42 (2010).
45 Amy A. Liberty, Note, Defending the Black Sheep of the Forensic DNA Family:
The Case for Implementing Familial DNA Searching in Minnesota, 38 HAMLINE L. REV.
467, 473 (2015).
46 Id.
47 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41800, DNA TESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
BACKGROUND, CURRENT LAW, AND GRANTS 1 (2018); CODIS FAQs, supra note 41.
48 See CODIS FAQs, supra note 41. Some requirements include that DNA analysis
satisfy the FBI’s quality assurance standards, that testing laboratories be accredited and
audited, and that the data be disclosed only in certain circumstances to protect privacy
interests. See DNA Identification Act of 1994, 34 U.S.C. § 12592(b) (Supp. 2017).
49 See BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING, supra note 16, at 94 (noting that
standardized markers must be used to conduct effective DNA testing); CODIS FAQs,
supra note 41.
50 Greely et al., supra note 26, at 251.
51 BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING, supra note 16, at 445–46.
52 Id. at 446.
53 Id.
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sample are linked, indicating that a known offender has left his
or her DNA at a crime scene. A forensic hit occurs when forensic
samples collected from multiple crime scenes link, indicating that
the same perpetrator was present at each scene,54 but their
identity is not necessarily known. As of April 2019, the FBI
indicated that CODIS has “added value” to 461,434 criminal
investigations by producing over 472,078 hits.55
3. CODIS Stringency Levels
CODIS allows the analyst who is conducting each search
to adjust specific criteria, including the stringency at which the
search is conducted.56 There are three stringency levels of CODIS
searches: high, moderate, and low.57 High stringency requires all
alleles to match, indicating the offender profile and crime scene
profile are identical, whereas moderate and low stringency
searches do not result in a perfect match between the offender
profile and crime scene sample.58 Moderate and low stringency
searches were implemented to generate matches when handling
degraded samples or samples that contain DNA from more than
one contributor.59 Because low stringency searches have very
limited utility, they are rarely conducted.60
II.

REGULATING CODIS-BASED FAMILIAL SEARCHES

When biological material, such as bodily fluids, is collected
from a crime scene and run through CODIS, a match to an
offender profile indicates that the databased offender is the source

54 See Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 751, 762–63 (2011) [hereinafter Ram, Fortuity].
55 CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/
services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics [https://perma.cc/6QVG-QAZY].
56 Gabel, supra note 44, at 17.
57 Liberty, supra note 45, at 474.
58 Id. High stringency requires all alleles to match at each of the twenty loci
searched. As of January 1, 2017, the FBI increased the number of CODIS Core Loci from
thirteen to twenty. CODIS FAQs, supra note 41. A match at a high stringency search
indicates that the offender is almost certainly the source of DNA from the crime scene.
Moderate stringency requires that all alleles match, but the two profiles may have a different
number of alleles. Id. In moderate stringency matches there cannot be any mismatches, but
one of the profiles may contain additional alleles, often indicating that the DNA sample is a
mixture between two or more people. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 32, at 297. Finally,
a low stringency match permits a one allele mismatch at some loci, with the remainder loci
matching at high or moderate stringency. CODIS MANUAL, supra note 30, at 14.
59 Liberty, supra note 45, at 475.
60 See id. at 475 n.62, 481.
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of the DNA collected from the crime scene.61 When no match is
revealed, this suggests that there is no offender in the database
who matches the source of DNA from the crime scene. State and
federal DNA databanks, therefore, work particularly well for
matching crime scene samples to offenders already in the
database.62 However, if there is a DNA hit that matches at a
significant number of loci, but not all twenty loci, this may
indicate that a close biological relative of the databased person is
the source of DNA from the crime scene.63 Relying on what was
known about genetics, law enforcement and scientists wanted to
leverage the power of the CODIS database through the use of
familial searches.64 Knowing the true perpetrator is not in the
database, law enforcement agencies may request that analysts
deliberately search for an offender whose profile is such a close
match to the crime scene that the databased person is likely a
biological relative of the true unknown perpetrator.65
Jurisdictions vary widely in their approach to regulating
familial searches. Though familial searching of CODIS is relatively
new in the United States, the United Kingdom has employed this
technique for nearly two decades.66 Knowing the technological and
scientific capabilities, law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and
victims’ families were eager to employ CODIS-based familial
searching in the United States.67 Many states, however, appear
reluctant to formally regulate familial searching.68 This has created
61 See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41800, DNA TESTING IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: BACKGROUND, CURRENT LAW, GRANTS, AND ISSUES 1, 3 (2015);
CODIS FAQs, supra note 41.
62 See Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 881 (2015)
[hereinafter Ram, DNA by the Entirety].
63 Ram, Fortuity, supra note 54, at 763–64.
64 While the FBI does not permit familial searching of the NDIS database, they
do permit disclosure of partial matches, as those are considered distinctive from familial
searching. A partial match “is the spontaneous product of a routine database search,” while
familial searching “is an intentional or deliberate search of the database . . . for the purpose
of potentially identifying close biological relatives.” CODIS FAQs, supra note 41. Familial
searches conducted deliberately use a “specialized software (separate from CODIS) to
detect and statistically rank a list of potential candidates in the DNA database who may
be close biological relatives . . . to the unknown individual contributing the evidence DNA
profile.” Michael B. Field et al., Study of Familial DNA Searching Policies and Practices 1
(Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Award No. 2013-R2-CX-0013, 2017).
65 See Familial Search Process Overview, N.Y. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVICES
(May 21, 2018), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/forensic/forms/Familial-Search-ProcessOverview-05-21-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX28-9CCW]; CODIS FAQs, supra note 41, at 10.
66 Rafaela Granja & Helena Machado, Ethical Controversies of Familial
Searching: The Views of Stakeholders in the United Kingdom and in Poland, 44 SCI. TECH.
& HUM. VALUES 1068, 1073–74 (2019).
67 See Seth Augenstein, Familial Searching Approved by DNA Forensics
Committee in NY, FORENSIC MAG. (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.forensicmag.com/news/
2017/03/familial-searching-approved-dna-forensics-committee-ny?cmpid=horizontal
content [https://perma.cc/WMX7-2RJK].
68 Liberty, supra note 45, at 476; see Ram, Fortuity, supra note 54, at 765.
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a “myriad of confusing, incomplete, and varying policies”
surrounding the use of CODIS-based familial searches.69 Clear
regulations and formal policies of CODIS-based familial searching,
such as those implemented in Colorado and New York, would
promote transparency and thus, more public oversight, benefitting
both opponents and supporters of familial searching.70
A.

The United Kingdom: Pioneers of Familial Searching

England has long been at the forefront of utilizing DNA in
criminal investigations.71 In 1986, law enforcement in the United
Kingdom used Dr. Alec Jeffreys’ discovery of “DNA fingerprinting”
to solve two homicides, exonerating a wrongly accused individual
and arresting the true perpetrator.72 In that case, two fifteen-yearold girls had been raped and murdered a few hundred yards apart
from one another.73 Both young girls had been killed in a similar
fashion, leading law enforcement to believe the same perpetrator
had committed both crimes.74 Richard Buckland, a seventeen-yearold boy was arrested, but after Jeffreys compared Buckland’s DNA
sample against semen recovered from both victims’ bodies, he
discovered that Buckland’s DNA did not match the evidence from
either crime scene sample.75 Later, based on a tip, the police
interviewed Colin Pitchfork, who confessed to the murders. A blood
sample was collected from Pitchfork, confirming that “his DNA
profile matched semen from both murder scenes.”76 The first use of
forensic DNA typing proved successful—not only because a serial
murdered was justly convicted, but also because “Jeffreys’ work
almost certainly saved Buckland from suffering a serious
miscarriage of justice.”77
Liberty, supra note 45, at 476.
See Natalie Ram, DNA Confidential: State Law Enforcement Policies for
Genetic Databases Lack Transparency, SCI. PROGRESS 2–4 (Oct. 2009), https://www.
scienceprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/DNA_matching.pdf [https://perma.cc/A47
R-JZ67] [hereinafter Ram, DNA Confidential]; infra Sections II.B, C.
71 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 183697, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA
TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 14–15
(Nov. 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183697.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8T3-VB
VE] [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING]; BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA
TYPING, supra note 16, at 2–3.
72 BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING, supra note 16, at 2–3; see THE FUTURE OF
FORENSIC DNA TESTING, supra note 71, at 14–15.
73 Ian Cobain, Killer Breakthrough – The Day DNA Evidence First Nailed a
Murderer, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/
07/killer-dna-evidence-genetic-profiling-criminal-investigation [https://perma.cc/XF6JQ8DA]; see BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING, supra note 16, at 3.
74 BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING, supra note 16, at 3; Cobain, supra note 73.
75 Cobain, supra note 73.
76 BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING, supra note 16, at 3.
77 Cobain, supra note 73.
69
70
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In 2002, the United Kingdom became the first country to
formally implement the use of familial searching in criminal
investigations through its National Criminal Intelligence DNA
Database.78 The technique was used in a well-known case from
the 1980s, where a serial rapist plagued South Yorkshire,
England and violently attacked and raped at least six women.79
Investigations into the gruesome attacks led nowhere. Even with
a DNA profile sourced from semen collected from the victims’
clothes, there was no match in the national DNA database.80 In
2006, investigators decided to use familial searching to try and
identify an individual whose genetic profile was similar enough to
the crime scene evidence to indicate a familial relation.81 That
search returned forty-three hits.82 June Lloyd, whose DNA was
stored in the national databank due to an unrelated incident, was
the third person investigators approached, and Ms. Lloyd
informed detectives that she had a brother, James.83 James Lloyd,
a family man with no criminal history, was arrested and
confessed to raping and attempting to rape multiple women, for
which he was eventually sentenced to an indeterminate term of
fifteen years.84 James Lloyd’s “conviction was hailed . . . as the
biggest victory yet” in a case using familial DNA searching.85
B.

Colorado’s Familial Searching Policy

As the United States attempted to catch up with Europe,
an increasing number of states “expressed a growing interest in
familial DNA searching.”86 One of the biggest proponents of
familial DNA searching in the United States was Mitch
Morrissey, the former District Attorney of Denver, Colorado.87 In
Granja & Machado, supra note 66, at 1073.
DNA Traps Rapist with Shoe Fetish, BBC NEWS (July 17, 2006), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/south_yorkshire/5187634.stm [https://perma.cc/FF39A7RT]. The attacker was labeled the “Dearne Valley Shoe Rapist” because of his routine
practice of stealing his victims’ high-heeled stiletto shoes, almost as a trophy, after tying
them up with their stockings. Id.; Suter, supra note 24, at 310.
80 Suter, supra note 24, at 310.
81 Id.; DNA Traps Rapist with Shoe Fetish, supra note 79.
82 Daniel Schorn, A Not So Perfect Match, CBS NEWS (Mar. 23, 2007), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/a-not-so-perfect-match/2/ [https://perma.cc/L264-DWF8].
83 Id.
84 Shoe Rapist Victim Waives Anonymity to Reveal Ordeal, EVENING STANDARD
(Sept. 5, 2006), https://www.standard.co.uk/news/shoe-rapist-victim-waives-anonymityto-reveal-ordeal-7173588.html [https://perma.cc/L8HU-R7V6]. Underneath a trapdoor in
Lloyd’s printing firm officers found lingerie, jewelry, stockings, and over one hundred
pairs of women’s shoes. Id.
85 DNA Traps Rapist with Shoe Fetish, supra note 79.
86 Field et al., supra note 64, at 1.
87 States Using Familial Searching, DNA FORENSICS (Aug. 25, 2012), http://
www.dnaforensics.com/statesandfamilialsearches.aspx [https://perma.cc/HH6Q-WGSX].
78
79
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2008, Morrissey became the first District Attorney in the United
States to develop and implement familial DNA searching in cold
case investigations.88 Familial searching was first used in Denver
to identify a suspect accused of breaking into two cars and
stealing $1.40 in change.89 Morrissey used familial searching to
locate a near-match to DNA evidence left at the crime scene,
which led investigators to the suspect’s brother.90 Investigators
then used traditional methods, such as interviewing witnesses
and reviewing public records, to identify the defendant, whose
DNA was collected, tested, and compared against the crime scene
sample.91 This comparison confirmed that the defendant’s DNA
was a perfect match to the DNA collected from the crime scene.92
Success, however, did not come without backlash.
Opponents of familial searching disapproved of the privacy
implications for the defendant as well as the notion that such
invasive technology was being used to solve minor crimes.93 So, in
October 2009, the Colorado Bureau of Investigations (CBI)
released a policy outlining the procedures for familial searching.94
The CBI policy lays out three scenarios in which familial
searching may be conducted: 1) when a possible match is
identified via a traditional CODIS search and the case is under
investigation; 2) when the chief law enforcement officer of the
investigating agency or the district attorney makes a special
request for a search on an ongoing investigation with significant
public safety concerns; and 3) when “[a] routine familial search
[is] performed by the CBI.”95 Although the CBI’s familial
88 COLO. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DNA FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY 1 (2009),
http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/ColoradoPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3MQ-AWZD]
[hereinafter CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY]; Howard Pankratz, Denver Uses “Familial DNA
Evidence” to Solve Car Break-Ins, DENVER POST (Nov. 16, 2009), https://www.denverpost.
com/2009/11/16/denver-uses-familial-dna-evidence-to-solve-car-break-ins/ [https://perma.cc/2Y
ZZ-4RKE]; Dist. Att’y Mitch Morrissey, Address at the City Club of Denver (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://cityclubofdenver.org/event-2128807 [https://perma.cc/U57H-VBEM].
89 Ed Andrieski, If You’re Kin to a Convict, His DNA Could Finger You,
TUSCON.COM (Feb. 10, 2010), https://tucson.com/news/science/if-you-re-kin-to-a-convicthis-dna-could/article_0ff886a3-7b1a-5f62-bf5f-de3470c0735a.html [https://perma.cc/PE
R7-XWEU]; see Pankratz, supra note 88.
90 Pankratz, supra note 88.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Joyce Kim et al., Policy Implications for Familial Searching, INVESTIGATIVE
GENETICS, Nov. 2011, at 3–5; Jaclyn Allen, ‘A Killer in the Family’: Former Denver DA
Co-Founds Familial DNA Search Company, DENVER CHANNEL (Sept. 28, 2018), https://
www.thedenverchannel.com/news/crime/-a-killer-in-the-family-former-denver-da-cofounds-familial-dna-search-company [https://perma.cc/BL2Z-WQDD]; Ryan Warner,
Denver’s Use of Familial DNA Raises Privacy Concerns, COLO. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 5, 2010),
https://www.cpr.org/show-segment/denvers-use-of-familial-dna-raises-privacy-concerns/
[https://perma.cc/UDV3-XAJU].
94 See CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY, supra note 88.
95 Id. at 1.
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searching policy is not regulated through legislation, it still serves
as a model for many other jurisdictions looking to implement
familial searching as a new tool for law enforcement.96
The CBI requires numerous procedural conditions to be
satisfied prior to the performance of any familial search.97 The
CBI prefers joint requests for familial searches from the district
attorney and chief law enforcement agency.98 The policy requires
the request to be in writing and to certify “[t]hat the evidentiary
DNA profile is from a case having significant public safety
concerns and the familial search result is critical to advancing the
investigation.”99 Further, the joint request must confirm “[t]hat
standard investigative leads have been exhausted, or a specific
exception [must be] articulated.”100 Though these requirements
appear to provide a safeguard against the use of CODIS-based
familial searching in petty cases, the policy fails to provide a
specific definition of either “significant public safety concerns” or
the adjective “critical” in describing the advancement of the
investigation. Such failures may lead to potential manipulation
by law enforcement agencies, including prosecutors’ offices, in an
effort to sidestep the policy’s requirements.101 Although one may
rest assured that traditional investigative measures will be
exhausted prior to the performance of any familial searches, the
policy fails to specifically define “standard investigative leads”
and what it means to have exhausted such leads.102
The CBI also demands that the crime scene profile itself
meet specific criteria.103 The DNA sample must be “either a singlesource profile or a clearly defined major component of a mixture.”104
For male candidates, Y-STR testing must be conducted, and
written results of that test provided to the CBI.105 Once testing is
completed, the CBI must release a case report to the chief law
enforcement officer and district attorney with the following:
“Identifying information of any individual having sufficient DNA
markers in common with the DNA offender profile,” and a
statement indicating that the information contained in the report
“is for law enforcement investigatory purposes only.”106
See id.
See Field et al., supra note 64, at 7.
98 CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY, supra note 88, at 1.
99 Id. at 2.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Field et al., supra note 64, at 7.
104 CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY, supra note 88, at 2.
105 Id.; see also Field et al., supra note 64, at 7.
106 CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY, supra note 88, at 2 (emphasis omitted). By
indicating that the results of the familial search are merely investigative leads, Colorado
96
97
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Lastly, the agency receiving the results of a familial search
must agree to follow certain policies, procedures, and
requirements.107 The CBI must initially review the results of the
familial search to determine if anyone is “of immediate interest to
the investigation.”108 Further, the investigating law enforcement
agency must examine whether the individual(s) identified by the
familial search are related to the databased person.109 This may
include creating a “family tree” using the information gleaned
from the Y-STR testing to determine male relatives.110 The CBI
also indicates a number of records that should be scoured to
determine the strength of the familial search results. Some
examples include criminal history checks, jail records, such as
inmate visitor logs and inmate profiles from the Department of
Correction, and public records.111 After the records inquiry, the
investigator is tasked with reviewing the independent evidence in
the case to determine if any of the individuals identified by the
familial search are potential suspects.112 Such investigation
consists of reviewing any video, work history, Department of
Motor Vehicle records, and re-interviewing necessary
witnesses.113 Finally, law enforcement must obtain a Court Order
for Nontestimonial Identification in order to collect a
confirmatory DNA sample from the suspect.114 This sample is then
compared to the forensic profile, and the results provided to the
investigating agency and the district attorney’s office.115
The CBI policy considers a broad range of privacy concerns
by including both process requirements as well as notice
requirements.116 Additionally, in the very beginning of the policy, the
CBI clearly denotes that “[t]he process specified in the policy was
developed keeping privacy concerns in mind.”117 Thus, it is evident
that Colorado had a keen sense of the privacy implications and
aimed to ameliorate such concerns through the safeguards built into
their familial searching policy. But their efforts fall short of
attempts to provide additional protections against any privacy invasions. Though the CBI
attempts to mitigate opponents’ concerns by assuring the public that the results of a familial
search will be used in the same manner as any traditional investigative lead, in reality, it is
hard to determine investigators’ degree of reliance on the results of familial searches.
107 Id. at 3.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 4; see COLO. R. CRIM. P. 41.1.
115 CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY, supra note 88, at 4.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1.
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establishing the kind of unambiguous, detailed protections sufficient
to effectively balance the utility of familial searching with
individual’s constitutionally-protected privacy rights.
C.

New York State Regulations on Familial Searches

While familial searching is not performed at the national
level, numerous states, including New York and Colorado perform
such searches at the state level, with varying regulations in place.
Though federal legislation explicitly permitting the use of familial
DNA searching has been introduced in Congress, it has never
been successful, and therefore federal agencies may not conduct
familial searches through NDIS.118 With formal regulations in
place governing the performance and reporting of CODIS-based
familial searching,119 New York is one of the few states to make
such regulations publicly accessible.120
In 1996, New York State created a computerized DNA
databank governed by the Commission on Forensic Science,
which allows DNA information to be shared among participating
local, state, and national databases as part of CODIS.121 New
York, like every other state, can independently decide, through
the state legislature, under what criteria to collect and store
DNA in the state databank.122 In its infancy, the New York State
Databank included only DNA profiles collected from people
convicted of homicide and specific sex-related crimes.123 In 2012,
however, New York became the “first ‘all crimes DNA’ state in
the nation, by requiring DNA samples be collected from anyone

118 Liberty, supra note 45, at 495. The Scientific Working Group on DNA
Analysis Methods (SWGDAM), however, did form the Familial Searching Ad Hoc
Working Group to study the viability of familial searching on a federal level. For the
group’s recommendations see generally SCI. WORKING GRP. ON DNA ANALYSIS METHODS,
RECOMMENDATIONS ON FAMILIAL SEARCHING, http://media.wix.com/ugd/4344b0_46b526
3cab994f16aeedb01419f964f6.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6YB-5PU2] [hereinafter SWGDAM
RECOMMENDATIONS].
119 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6192.3 (laying out the standards
for the establishment and operation of a DNA Identification Index, or a DNA Databank,
in New York State).
120 Ram, DNA Confidential, supra note 70, at 4.
121 See NYS DNA Databank and CODIS, N.Y. ST. DIVISION CRIM. JUST.
SERVICES, https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/forensic/dnabrochure.htm [https://perma.
cc/T34E-74X5]; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-b (9). The Commission on Forensic Science,
created in 1994, regulates public forensic DNA testing, develops processes of accrediting
state forensic laboratories, requires qualifications for lab personnel, and approves
laboratories to perform certain forensic methodologies. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 995-a, -b.
122 Lena M. Carlucci, Note, DNA Collection at Birth: A Uniform System of
Identification, 26 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 303, 309 (2012).
123 NYS DNA Databank Qualifying Offenses, N.Y. ST. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVICES,
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/forensic/dnaoffenses.htm [https://perma.cc/6HC7-EXCM].
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convicted of a felony or Penal Law misdemeanor.”124 This
increased the possibility of implicating relatives of databased
persons when lower stringency searches were run.125
In 2017, the New York Commission on Forensic Science
approved CODIS-based familial searching as a result of fierce
lobbying by advocates, including the parents of Karina Vetrano, a
thirty-year-old who was killed while jogging in her Queens
neighborhood in August 2016.126 DNA was recovered from under
Vetrano’s fingernails and near her throat, as well as from the
surface of her cell phone, which was found near her body.127
Frustrated that no matches were uncovered when DNA from the
crime scene was run through CODIS,128 law enforcement, aided
by Vetrano’s parents, lobbied to run a CODIS-based familial
search in order to look for possible relatives of the perpetrator.129
Although Vetrano’s murder was eventually solved through
traditional investigative methods, it sparked a debate for the use
of familial searching in New York.130
In the interest of public accessibility, all parties had an
opportunity to testify at a meeting held by the Commission prior
to the official codification of familial searching.131 Erin Murphy,
a professor at NYU Law who specializes in forensic science and
has been an outspoken critic of familial searching, stated “[i]n
contrast to criminal offenders . . . the ordinary law-abiding
people targeted by familial searches—people who have
committed no act to qualify them for inclusion in the state’s

124 Press Release, Governor Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Signs Law to Expand
New York’s DNA Databank (Mar. 19, 2012), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/gover
nor-cuomo-signs-law-expand-new-yorks-DNA-databank [https://perma.cc/THE7-VM76].
125 See Suter, supra note 24, at 321.
126 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 6192.3(h); Anthony M. DeStefano, State
Panel of DNA Experts Approve of ‘Familial Searching’ in NY, NEWSDAY (Mar. 27, 2017),
https://www.newsday.com/news/region-state/state-panel-of-dna-experts-approve-of-familalsearching-in-n-y-1.13321976 [https://perma.cc/3LVC-UDQB]; Augenstein, supra note 67.
127 Jan Ransom, Mystery of Karina Vetrano’s Death Ends with Murder
Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/nyregion/
karina-vetrano-trial-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/B6BM-MKUY].
128 Joseph Goldstein & Al Baker, New York Police Struggle to Generate Leads
in Murder of Queens Jogger, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
08/23/nyregion/new-york-police-struggle-to-generate-leads-in-murder-of-queens-jogger.
html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/B5BJ-QGBW].
129 Eli Rosenberg, Family DNA Searches Seen as Crime-Solving Tool, and
Intrusion on Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27. 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/
nyregion/familial-dna-searching-karina-vetrano.html [https://perma.cc/U4BN-SJLW].
130 Augenstein, supra note 67.
131 Press Release, Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., New York State Commission
on Forensic Science Sets Special Meeting to Discuss Familial DNA Searching (Dec. 20,
2016), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/pio/press_releases/2016-12-20_pressrelease.
html [https://perma.cc/3MA2-9F7R].
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database—retain their right to genetic privacy.”132 However, the
New York City Police Department strongly supported familial
searching, stating:
Serial killers, child murderers and rapists were brought to justice
through the power of Familial Searching. . . . There is no scientific or
legal reason to believe that Familial Searching cannot provide the
same truth-finding evidence that the criminal justice system has
relied upon in using conventional DNA comparisons for decades.133

Ultimately, the Commission issued a compromise policy
laying out certain conditions, procedures, and requirements that
must be met when conducting a familial search in New York.
First, a familial search may only be jointly requested by the
investigating law enforcement agency and district attorney who
retains jurisdiction over the case if there is no exact or partial
match to a sample in the DNA databank.134 The regulations
specify that a partial match occurs “during” the course of routine
database search,135 while a familial search, which is distinct from
a partial match, is a “targeted” and deliberate search for
relatives.136 Case requirements include that the forensic profile
must be associated with qualifying crimes, as laid out by the
regulations.137 Aside from the crimes specified, the regulations
also includes a catch-all, permitting familial searches in cases
“presenting a significant public safety threat.”138 The regulations
attempt to protect individuals’ privacy rights by enumerating
crimes for which familial searching may be conducted. However,
similar to CBI’s policy, the inclusion of the catch-all phrase
undermines these protections by permitting law enforcement to
circumvent the safeguards intended to limit familial searches to
particularly heinous crimes. Furthermore, the requesting agency
132 Letter from Erin Murphy, to Michael C. Green, Comm’r N.Y.S. Forensic Sci.
Comm’n, re: Familial Searching , Agenda of the Special Joint Meeting of the N.Y. State
Comm’n. on Forensic Sci., DNA Subcommittee, at 193 (Jan. 18, 2017) (on file with author).
133 Statement of N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, NYPD’s Position on Familial Searching,
Agenda of the Special Joint Meeting of the N.Y. State Comm’n. on Forensic Sci., DNA
Subcommittee, at 260 (on file with author).
134 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6192.3(h)-(i). A “partial match refer[s] to
the determination during the CODIS candidate match confirmation process that a forensic
DNA profile is similar to a DNA profile in the offender index and a comparison reveals that
the offender may be a close biological relative of the source of the forensic index profile.”
§ 6192.1(q). A familial search, however, is a deliberate “evaluation of offenders’ DNA
profiles . . . which generates a list of candidate profiles to indicate potential biologically
related individuals.” § 6192.1(ab).
135 § 6192.1(q).
136 § 6192.1(ab).
137 § 6192.3(h)(1). The regulations state that the forensic DNA profile must be
related to a homicide, a violent felony sexual offense or an A felony for kidnapping, arson,
or terrorism. Id.
138 § 6192.3(h)(1)(iv).
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must confirm that “reasonable investigative efforts have been
taken” or “exigent circumstances exist.”139 Once again, by
including the exigency exception, the regulations leave a gap that
may encourage law enforcement to avoid employing traditional
investigative methods prior to requesting familial searching.
The New York regulations also necessitate that certain
sample requirements are met.140 The profile must: be a single
source profile or deduced from a mixture such that it can be
treated as a single source profile; appear to be directly related to
the perpetrator; reside in SDIS; and have been run through the
CODIS offender index.141 If the crime scene sample is accepted for
a familial search, the New York state police crime laboratory is
required to use validated software to perform the familial search
and then must generate a candidate list.142 That candidate list will
be evaluated based on “established kinship threshold value(s)”
and, if possible, the lab must also perform Y-STR testing on the
candidate samples to determine if the candidate’s DNA is from
the same paternal line as the crime scene sample.143 Lastly, when
the results of a familial DNA search are released, they must be in
writing and contain the following statements:
(i) the information provided is for investigatory law enforcement
purposes only; (ii) the forensic DNA profile could not have come from
the named offender in the DNA databank; (iii) the information
provided is not a definitive statement of a familial (i.e., biological)
relationship; and (iv) the information provided shall be treated only
as an investigative lead.144

The extensive conditions required for New York law enforcement
to conduct a familial search and then release the results aim to
protect privacy rights and ensure that law enforcement agencies
are conducting familial searches in an ethical and measured
manner. Yet, with the broad language of some conditions, the
regulations fail to sufficiently balance individuals’ privacy rights
with the advantages of familial searching.
III.

INVESTIGATIVE GENEALOGY SEARCHES

The market for direct-to-consumer genealogy testing has
mesmerized thousands of consumers who are interested in
finding out more about their ancestry, as well as people
139
140
141
142
143
144

§ 6192.3(h)(2)(i)–(ii).
Familial Search Process Overview, supra note 65.
Id.; see also § 6192.3 (h)(3).
§ 6192.3(j)(1).
§ 6192.3(j)(2)–(3).
§ 6192.3(k)(2)(i)–(iv).

2019]

23ANDEVERYONE

203

intrigued by the numerous other uses of such websites.145 The
“convergence of two long-standing trends”—direct-to-consumer
genetic testing and open-access genealogy databases—caused
the rise of law enforcement’s use of such sites to assist in locating
serial rapists and killers who have evaded law enforcement for
decades.146 Participants in these trends implicate, perhaps
unknowingly, the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of their
relatives when law enforcement uses the information on such
sites to locate the relatives of those who uploaded their DNA
profile to a public genealogy site.147
A.

The Rise of Genealogy Websites: 23andMe and
Ancestry.com

As genealogical testing becomes more affordable and
publicly accessible through online websites, more and more
individuals are captivated by direct-to-consumer genetic
genealogy tests.148 Today, “genealogy is the second most popular
hobby in the U.S. after gardening . . . , and the second most
visited category of websites, after pornography.”149 The number
of people who have used direct-to-consumer genetic tests to
analyze their DNA more than doubled in 2017 alone.150 Studies
suggest that more than twelve million people have utilized such
tests, with the leading company being Ancestry.com, followed by
145 See generally McKenna Moore, Spotify Will Use Your DNA to Personalize Your
Music Playlists, FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/09/28/spotify-to-useyour-dna-for-playlists/ [https://perma.cc/6L28-TF67] (explaining that music streamer
Spotify has suggested another use for genetic databases which invites Ancestry customers
to type their DNA information into a playlist generator to “experience their culture”
through specially-selected music based on their genetic background); Jenae Sitzes, Who’s
More Likely to Keep Their New Year’s Resolutions: Men or Women?, PREVENTION (Dec. 27,
2018), https://www.prevention.com/life/a25693301/new-years-resolutions-study-23-andme/ [https://perma.cc/ZXW3-PYBN] (explaining how 23andMe performed a study using
genome data contained on their website in hopes of finding a genetic explanation for why
some people are better at keeping their New Year’s resolutions).
146 Deborah Netburn, So Many People Have Had Their DNA Sequenced That
They’ve Put Other People’s Privacy in Jeopardy, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://
www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-DNA-genealogy-privacy-20181012story.html [https://perma.cc/EF2M-PEWD].
147 Privacy Concerns After Public Genealogy Database Used to ID “Golden State
Killer” Suspect, CBS NEWS (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/privacyconcerns-after-public-genealogy-database-used-to-id-golden-state-killer-suspect/
[https://perma.cc/PA9A-TY7A].
148 See Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up,
MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-wasthe-year-consumer-DNA-testing-blew-up/ [https://perma.cc/W3DS-WMZQ].
149 Gregory Rodriguez, How Genealogy Became Almost as Popular as Porn,
TIME (May 30, 2014), http://time.com/133811/how-genealogy-became-almost-as-popularas-porn/ [https://perma.cc/XN9L-XPZU].
150 Regalado, supra note 148.
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23andMe.151 Direct-to-consumer genetic tests can readily be
purchased online or in stores, thereby increasing their appeal.152
Customers collect their own DNA by spitting into a test tube and
sending their DNA to these private companies.153 The companies
then return the results directly to the consumer through a
secure website or written report.154 Many of the popular sites
offer these services at low costs, especially during the holiday
seasons, ranging from $79 to $99, incentivizing consumers to
test themselves or to give the test as a gift.155
B.

Open-Access Genealogy Databases: A Gold Mine for Law
Enforcement

The direct-to-consumer genetic genealogy testing industry
is predicted to continue growing at an exponential rate.156 The use
of these direct-to-consumer genealogy sites in conjunction with
open-access genealogy websites, such as GEDmatch, provides law
enforcement with a uniquely probative tool.157 Unlike membership
fee-based sites, such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com, GEDmatch
is a free genealogy website where users can upload DNA profiles
previously obtained from commercial companies and widen their
search for ancestors.158 Often people will pay 23andMe or
Ancestry.com to generate their DNA profile, and then upload that
profile to GEDmatch for free.159
At the same time as GEDmatch gives their users the joyful
possibility of charting their family trees, the database
simultaneously serves as a resource for law enforcement officers

Id.
See What Is Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Testing?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED.
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/dtcgenetictesting/directtoconsumer
[https://perma.cc/G7QK-BMU6].
153 How It Works, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/howitworks/ [https://
perma.cc/AQE2-KJ5X]; Taking an AncestryDNA® Test, ANCESTRYDNA, https://support.
ancestry.com/s/article/Taking-an-AncestryDNA-Test [https://perma.cc/U9NE-VAKC].
154 What Is Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Testing?, supra note 152.
155 See Which Genealogy DNA Test Is the Best? A Detailed Comparison Guide to
Help You Decide, FAM. HIST. DAILY, https://familyhistorydaily.com/genealogy-help-andhow-to/ancestry-DNA-tests-comparison-guide/ [https://perma.cc/Z3U5-RPSC].
156 Regalado, supra note 148.
157 See Matthias Gafni & Lisa M. Krieger, Here’s the ‘Open-Source’ Genealogy
DNA Website That Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 20,
2018), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/04/26/ancestry-23andme-deny-assistinglaw-enforcement-in-east-area-rapist-case/ [https://perma.cc/3PRR-4BQU].
158 Privacy Concerns, supra note 147.
159 See Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked
Through a Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/health/DNA-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html
[https://perma.cc/A8TU-JD2P].
151
152
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whose rape and murder investigations have gone cold.160 In
contrast to CODIS, which generally examines STRs at twenty loci
and thus is not known to code for any specific traits, the DNA
profiles generated from commercial databases use technology
which looks at thousands of locations on the genome called singlenucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).161 Unlike the twenty core loci
used by CODIS, these SNPs reveal information about an
individual’s geographic origins, heredity, and physical traits.162
No extraordinary measures need to be taken in order for
law enforcement to access data on public websites such as
GEDmatch, MyHeritage, and Family Tree DNA.163 Officers do not
need to obtain search warrants or follow statutory strictures to
access these sites.164 These sites are open to all users, including
law enforcement, to access voluntarily posted information,
including raw DNA profiles generated and uploaded from sites
such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com.165
Until May 2019, GEDmatch was clear in their Terms of
Service and Privacy Policy that although the intended use of the
website was for genealogical research, the company could not
guarantee that the information would not be used for other
purposes.166 The Terms of Service explicitly stated that such
other uses could include “[f]amilial searching by third parties
such as law enforcement agencies to identify the perpetrator of
a crime, or to identify remains.”167 After much backlash from
privacy advocates, GEDmatch reversed their policy to require

160 Genealogist Colleen Fitzpatrick described GEDmatch as “a desert island
where all the genealogists can go play in the sand.” Jessica Testa, Nobody Was Going to
Solve These Cold Cases. Then Came the DNA Crime Solvers, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 22,
2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jtes/DNA-cold-case-crime-doe-projectgenealogy [https://perma.cc/X8BT-KTVU]. Not only do genealogists benefit from the
sandbox of GEDmatch, but so too do members of law enforcement when they attempt to
solve cold cases.
161 Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To Genealogy
Database, ATLANTIC (June 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/
06/gedmatch-police-genealogy-database/561695/ [https://perma.cc/Q32D-CGAN].
162 Id.
163 See Brown, supra note 21.
164 See Privacy Concerns, supra note 147.
165 Brown, supra note 21.
166 Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH (May 20, 2018) [hereinafter
GEDmatch 2018 Terms of Service] (on file with the author). The Terms of Service and
Privacy Policy have since been updated to require users to specifically opt-in to permit
comparison of their DNA profiles with profiles uploaded by law enforcement.
GEDmatch.com, Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH (May 18, 2019), https://
www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm [https://perma.cc/S3RT-YQ79 [hereinafter GEDmatch 2019
Terms of Service].
167 GEDmatch 2018 Terms of Service, supra note 166.

206

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1

users to affirmatively opt in to law enforcement searches.168
Users are now automatically unsearchable by law enforcement,
unless they choose to opt in to such searches.169 Unlike
GEDmatch, 23andMe and Ancestry.com explicitly state that it
is their policy to oppose inquires by law enforcement to protect
customer privacy, unless compelled by court order.170
While complete restriction on law enforcement’s ability to
use open-access genealogy sites would successfully protect
everyone’s privacy, it shuts down a valuable and effective new
method of investigation. Although opponents challenge familial
searching based on the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, the state interests in
familial searching for investigating and prosecuting violent
serial criminals cannot be ignored.171 In applying the Fourth
Amendment balancing test, law enforcement should be able to
access genealogy websites, but Congress must implement a
statute that requires certain conditions and procedures be met
prior to the search in order to protect the privacy rights of users
and their relatives.
C.

Case Study of Investigative Genealogy: A Search for
Serial Killers and Rapists

One of the most compelling arguments that supporters of
familial searching can make is to point to the success stories that
have removed serial murders and rapists from the streets. On
April 24, 2018, Joseph James DeAngelo, 72, was arrested in
connection with more than fifty rapes and thirteen murders, all
cold cases from the 1970s and 1980s.172 DeAngelo, commonly
known as the “Golden State Killer,” evaded law enforcement for
over four decades.173 Investigators uploaded DNA collected from
one of the crime scenes to GEDmatch, and for the first time

168 Eric Levenson, How a Utah Assault Case Upended the Cutting-edge Website
that Caught the Golden State Killer, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/27/us/geneticgenealogy-gedmatch-privacy/index.html [https://perma.cc/7PBU-EDT7].
169 Id.
170 Privacy Concerns, supra note 147. Both Ancestry.com and 23andMe make a
point to disclose the number of government requests that they have successfully fought
off in order to protect the privacy interests of their customers. See Ancestry 2018
Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/transparency [https://
perma.cc/C8XU-JFEN]; Transparency Report, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/
transparency-report/ [https://perma.cc/7X58-GDL4].
171 See David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of
“Familial Searching,” 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 128–29 (2013); Pattock, supra note 28, at 852.
172 Stevick, supra note 3.
173 Id.
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successfully ran a familial search through a genealogy database
not created for law enforcement purposes.174
In DeAngelo’s case, law enforcement officers created a fake
user profile on GEDmatch and submitted a DNA profile generated
from a sample recovered from a 1980 murder, which returned
numerous matches to distant relatives.175 After receiving basic
information on these distant relatives from GEDmatch, genealogist
Barbara Rae-Venter created dozens of family trees to narrow down
the potential suspects.176 For four months, the team working on the
case “pored over census records, newspaper obituaries, gravesite
locaters, and police and commercial databases to find each relative
and, ultimately, DeAngelo.”177 Even after DeAngelo was the sole
suspect left, detectives used traditional investigative methods to
confirm his identity and build the case. Detectives surreptitiously
collected DNA from DeAngelo’s car door handle and a discarded
tissue and tested those items against the crime scene sample,
confirming the match.178 With this information, DeAngelo was
apprehended in 2018 and charged with thirteen counts of murder.179
The case of the “Golden State Killer” is now just one example of how
law enforcement successfully employed open-access genealogy
databases to locate relatives, and eventually the perpetrators, of
decades-old homicides.
Just five months later, a second serial rapist known as the
“NorCal rapist” was identified using the same techniques used to

174 Tim Arango et al., To Catch a Killer: A Fake Profile on a DNA Site and a
Pristine Sample, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/us/
golden-state-killer-case-joseph-deangelo.html [https://perma.cc/36N6-Q6UU]; Natalie
Ram, Incidental Informants: Police Can Use Genealogy Databases to Help Identify
Criminal Relatives – But Should They?, 51 MD. B.J. 8, 9 (2018) [hereinafter Ram,
Incidental Informants].
175 Arango et al., supra note 174; Avi Selk, The Ingenious and ‘Dystopian’ DNA
Technique Police Used to Hunt the ‘Golden State Killer’ Suspect, WASH. POST (Apr. 28,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2018/04/27/golden-statekiller-DNA-website-gedmatch-was-used-to-identify-joseph-deangelo-as-suspect-policesay/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.648db25d3b7f [https://perma.cc/M24N-Z26H].
176 Mathias Gafni, The Woman Behind the Scenes Who Helped Capture the
Golden State Killer, MERCURY NEWS, https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/08/24/exc
lusive-the-woman-behind-the-scenes-who-helped-capture-the-golden-state-killer/
[https://perma.cc/6Y7C-H5YF].
177 Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, Investigators First
Found His Great-Great-Great-Grandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/to-find-alleged-golden-state-killer-investigatorsfirst-found-his-great-great-great-grandparents/2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b20bec548d501f_story.html?utm_term=.f177697726c0 [perma.cc/5SVH-R3T5].
178 Breeanna Hare, What We Know About the Golden State Killer Case, One
Year After a Suspect Was Arrested, CNN (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/
24/us/golden-state-killer-one-year-later/index.htmlear-later/index.html
[https://perma.cc/PR7Y-62N3].
179 Id.
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locate DeAngelo.180 Roy Charles Waller, 58, was suspected of
raping at least ten women between 1991 and 2006.181 DNA from
the crime scenes indicated that the same suspect committed a
number of these attacks, but the suspect remained unknown.182
Investigators then uploaded a DNA profile derived from blood at
one scene to GEDmatch, which returned a list of possible
relatives, and identified Waller as the suspect about a week
later.183 Investigators were able to quickly locate “Waller based on
his height, weight, appearance, past addresses and his ‘owning
similar guns to the ones used in the crimes,’” and confirmed his
identity as the perpetrator by comparing his DNA with evidence
collected from various crime scenes.184
The DeAngelo and Waller cases are just two of the many
examples that show the benefits of law enforcement’s use of
genetic genealogy sites. But the use of open-access genealogy
websites “[has] raised questions about how the growing and
often public repository of consumers’ most intimate data could
be used by authorities.”185 Along with the relief brought by
removing serial killers from the streets, there are also critical
ethical and privacy implications of law enforcement trolling
genealogical websites.186
IV.

PRIVACY AND POLICY CONCERNS OF CODIS-BASED
FAMILIAL SEARCHING AND INVESTIGATIVE GENEALOGY
SEARCHES

Familial searching on CODIS raises significant privacy
concerns under the Fourth Amendment; these concerns are even
greater with the emergence of investigative genealogy searches.187
180 Alex Emslie, UC Berkeley Employee Arrested, Suspected of NorCal Rape
Series Spanning 15 Years, KQED: CAL. REP. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/
11693951/uc-berkeley-employee-arrested-suspected-of-norcal-rape-series-spanning-15years [https://perma.cc/R3PG-X4K8].
181 Sam Stanton et al., NorCal Rapist Suspect Arrested. He’s a 58-Year-Old
Safety Specialist at UC Berkeley, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.
sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article218793610.html [https://perma.cc/BDN2-EDNH].
182 Id. The DNA profile from the incident was obtained after the NorCal rapist
assaulted the victim and bound her, and, in her attempt to fight back, the victim stabbed
her attacker. The perpetrator attempted to clean up the crime scene, but there was too
much blood, thus providing investigators with pools of DNA evidence. Eliott C.
McLaughlin, DNA in NorCal Rapist Case Links Suspect to Sexual Assaults in 6 Counties,
CNN (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/23/us/norcal-rapist-arrest-arraign
ment-DNA-genetic-genealogy/index.html [https://perma.cc/7L74-3ZJD].
183 Stanton et al., supra note 181.
184 Id.
185 Brown, supra note 21.
186 See Ram, Incidental Informants, supra note 174, at 9–10; Privacy Concerns,
supra note 147.
187 See Suter, supra note 24, at 328.
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CODIS-based familial searching is often criticized for encroaching
on two groups’ privacy interests. The first group consists of
“genetic informants,”188 or the databased person—the person who
is already in the databank and whose sample is a close match to
the forensic sample. The second group includes innocent family
members who come under police surveillance merely because of
their relatives’ criminal history.189 As law enforcement
increasingly utilizes CODIS-based familial searches and
investigative genealogy searches in criminal investigations, a
growing number of individuals’ Fourth Amendment privacy
rights are being implicated. Congress must act quickly to protect
these privacy rights by regulating such searches.
A.

Privacy Interest of Databased Persons

There are dramatic differences in the privacy interests of
individuals whose DNA profiles have been uploaded to a
government-operated databank as opposed to those who
voluntarily upload their profiles to an open-access genealogy
database. The Fourth Amendment ensures protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government and law
enforcement officers.190 The U.S. Supreme Court effectuated a
two-step inquiry, laid out by Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion
in Katz v. United States, to determine what constitutes a
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.191 First, one must exhibit an “actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”192 The Court
has long held that the cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness, which should be determined by balancing the
degree of government intrusion on one’s privacy with the
legitimate governmental interest served.193
188 Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 32, at 320 (citation omitted). Genetic
informant is a loaded term often used by privacy advocates when discussing people who
have their DNA stored in the national database, and thus, may involuntarily implicate
their family members. See Erica Haimes, Social and Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial
Searching in Forensic Investigations: Insights from Family and Kinship Studies, 34 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 263, 269 (2006); Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 32, at 320.
189 Suter, supra note 24, at 322, 349.
190 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”).
191 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
192 Id. at 361.
193 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (citing United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001)).
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It is well established that designated offenders of
qualifying crimes have a reduced expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.194 The compulsory collection of DNA from
qualifying offenders is not a violation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, as courts have held that individuals legally taken
into police custody have a diminished expectation of privacy.195
Thus, when a CODIS-based familial search is run, there is no
Fourth Amendment violation of the databased person because of
their reduced expectation of privacy.196
When applying this rationale to genealogy databases,
however, the argument becomes more complicated. Customers who
pay to have their DNA profiled and uploaded to a public genealogy
website may not have the same diminished expectation of privacy
as offenders whose DNA is stored in the government databank due
to an arrest or conviction.197 But, consumers effectively waive their
privacy rights by agreeing to the terms of service of the
genealogical websites they are using.198 Yet, many consumers who
upload their DNA to genealogy websites do not focus on the
conditions buried in the website’s terms of service.199 Customers,
therefore, may agree to these terms but still not expect law
enforcement to gain access to their genetic information.200
194 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 462–63 (2013). Due to these
“substantially diminished expectations of privacy, the minimal intrusion . . . and the
overwhelming societal interests so clearly furthered by the collection of DNA information
from convicted offenders, [the court] must conclude that compulsory DNA profiling of
qualified federal offenders is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” United
States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004).
195 See King, 569 U.S. at 461–63; see also Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178,
1188 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Numerous courts addressing DNA-indexing statutes have
explained that the identification of suspects is relevant not only to solving the crime for
which the suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to solve other
past and future crimes.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); People v.
Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 65–66 (Cal. 2010); Suter, supra note 24, at 330.
196 See Suter, supra note 24, at 330.
197 Guerrini et al., supra note 23, at 2.
198 See GEDmatch 2018 Terms of Service, supra note 166. By agreeing to these
terms, users indicate that the site cannot “guarantee that users will not find other uses,
including both current and new genealogical and non-genealogical uses.” The site
specifies as one of these uses, “[f]amilial searching by third parties such as law
enforcement agencies to identify the perpetrator of a crime.” Id. Similarly, Ancestry
informs users that the site may share personal information if “reasonably necessary
to . . . [c]omply with valid legal process[es].” Your Privacy, ANCESTRY, https://www.
ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement [https://perma.cc/MW9N-5CZ3].
199 See generally Natalie Ram, Genetic Privacy After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV.
40 (forthcoming 2019) (examining reasonable consumer privacy expectations regarding
genetic information in the wake of recent Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decisions
and the increased use of consumer genetic data by law enforcement).
200 See Brendan Koerner, Your Relative’s DNA Could Turn You into a Suspect,
WIRED (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/familial-dna-evidence-turnsinnocent-people-into-crime-suspects/ [https://perma.cc/44VQ-9AK6]; Natalie Ram, The
U.S. May Soon Have a De Facto National DNA Database, SLATE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://
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Courts have yet to decide whether it is reasonable for
consumers who have been forewarned of the possible uses of their
data to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in this
information.201 Nonetheless, when law enforcement officers access
these databases to conduct an investigative genealogy search,
customers who voluntarily upload their DNA are now under the
same scrutiny as designated offenders whose DNA is stored in
CODIS. Though the privacy interests implicated for the databased
person are significant, that individual is explicitly not the target of
an investigation in a CODIS-based familial search or an
investigative genealogical search.202 Rather, it is their biological
relatives that may be the source of the crime scene sample, and
thus, subject to investigation.203 The privacy interests of relatives
of databased individuals—whether in CODIS or a genealogy site—
are now significantly implicated by a CODIS-based familial search
or an investigative genealogy search.
B.

Privacy Interests of Relatives

Similar privacy concerns apply to both groups of
relatives—relatives implicated through genealogy searches and
relatives implicated through CODIS-based familial searches.204
In both circumstances, potentially innocent relatives of the
databased person may be subject to investigation solely based on
their relatedness to the databased person.205 Unlike databased
persons, their relatives do not have a diminished expectation of
privacy by virtue of being an offender or by agreeing to the terms
of service on a genealogy site.206 Relatives, however, may be
unable to sustain a Fourth Amendment challenge to these
searches due to lack of standing.207
The constitutional doctrine of standing concerns who has
the right to challenge an action or law under the Constitution.208
slate.com/technology/2019/03/national-dna-database-law-enforcement-genetic-gene
alogy.html [https://perma.cc/UDK8-PLYL] [hereinafter Ram, De Facto Database].
201 Laura Hautala, How Sharing Your DNA Solves Horrible Crimes . . . and Stirs a
Privacy Debate, CNET (July 2, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/how-sharing-your-dnasolves-horrible-crimes-and-stirs-a-privacy-debate/ [https://perma.cc/K2BY-UKHG].
202 Ram, DNA by the Entirety, supra note 62, at 882.
203 Id.
204 Joseph Zabel, Note, The Killer Inside Us: Law, Ethics, and the Forensic Use
of Consumer Genetics, 25 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 18–19 (forthcoming 2019).
205 Ram, De Facto Database, supra note 200.
206 See Ram, DNA Confidential, supra note 70, at 1.
207 Alexandra Nieto, Note, Familial Searching: How Implementing Minimum
Safeguards Ensures Constitutionally-Permissible Use of This Powerful Investigative
Tool, 40 CARDOZO L.R. 1765, 1785–86 (2019).
208 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132–33 (1978); see also Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963).
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The Supreme Court has held that “the issue of standing involves
two inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a particular legal
right has alleged ‘injury in fact,’ and second, whether the
proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather
than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third
parties.”209 Relatives who are identified from a CODIS-based
familial search or an investigative genealogy search will have
difficulty proving that the harm they suffered was caused by a
Fourth Amendment violation of their own rights, rather than the
rights of their databased relatives.210
Even if there are no Fourth Amendment issues at stake,
society may still wish to protect the privacy interests of relatives
of offenders in government databanks or relatives of customers in
genealogy databases on an ethical or policy basis.211 Opponents of
familial searching argue that due to the number of false positives
generated, investigations will unfairly scrutinize completely
innocent citizens.212 To balance the privacy and ethical concerns
with the immense benefits of CODIS-based familial searching
and investigative genealogy searches, safeguards should be
implemented to regulate law enforcements’ use of genealogy
websites in criminal investigations.
V.

REGULATING INVESTIGATIVE GENEALOGY SEARCHES:
BALANCING PUBLIC SECURITY WITH PRIVACY CONCERNS

Investigative genealogy searches by law enforcement,
where the warnings and privacy policies agreed to by customers
are often buried by the fine print of terms and conditions,213 must
be guided by a statutory framework.214 A balance must be struck
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 (citations omitted).
Nieto, supra note 207, at 1784–85.
211 See D. H. Barnes, Big Brother Is Watching You (And Your Family, Too): Familial
DNA Searches in Criminal Investigations, CRIM. LAW BULLETIN art. 2, Winter 2014.
212 See Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 32, at 317.
213 Guerrini et al., supra note 23.
214 On September 24, 2019 the United States Department of Justice released an
interim policy on “Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis and Searching” that goes into
effect on November 1, 2019. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTERIM POLICY, FORENSIC GENETIC
GENEALOGICAL DNA ANALYSIS AND SEARCHING (effective Nov. 1, 2019) [hereinafter DOJ
INTERIM POLICY]. Although law enforcement has increasingly used genetic genealogy to solve
cold cases for a few years, the Interim Policy provides “the first substantial attempt to address
‘how genetic genealogy should be done.’” Thomas F. Callaghan, Responsible Genetic
Genealogy, 366 SCI. 155, 155 (2019). The first page of the Interim policy, however, states that
the policy “is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any substantive
or procedural rights or benefits enforceable at law.” DOJ INTERIM POLICY, at 1 n.1. Thus, even
with this guidance, it is still necessary for Congress to pass a statute that creates uniformity
among state and federal law enforcement officers attempting to conduct investigative
genealogy searches. The DOJ’s policy contains nine sections detailing the essential
requirements for law enforcement’s use of forensic genetic genealogy. Press Release, U.S.
209
210
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between the state’s interest in locating and arresting violent
criminals, and the broader public interest in safeguarding privacy
rights. Congress should implement a statutory framework with
policies, procedures, and requirements that must be met prior to
law enforcement’s use of investigative genealogy searches in
criminal investigations. The proposed statute will help fairly and
predictably balance the competing interests.
A multi-step process must be implemented to regulate
investigative genealogy searches, borrowing from New York’s
regulations and Colorado’s policy on CODIS-based familial
searching.215 First, prior to any investigative genealogy search,
law enforcement should be required to certify that “[the] standard
investigative leads have been exhausted”216 by laying out, in
detail, what investigative methods have already been employed.
Second, the forensic profile must initially be searched in the
government database to ensure that there are no exact or partial
matches in CODIS.217 This requirement is vital to avoid any
unnecessary searches of genealogy databases when such
information can be found in CODIS. Third, investigative
genealogy searches should only be permitted if the forensic DNA
profile recovered from the crime scene meets certain
requirements. The forensic profile must be associated with a
particularly violent crime, as laid out by specific penal law
offenses, and the profile must be a robust, single-source profile, in
order to reduce the number of false leads.218 Fourth, pre-approved,
validated software should be used to conduct the search and
“generate a candidate list,”219 which should then be evaluated
based on “kinship threshold value(s).”220 Any additional Y-STR
analysis must be conducted if necessary.221
Once an investigative genealogy search is conducted and
a candidate list is generated, law enforcement should be required
Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Announces Interim Policy on Emerging Method to
Generate Leads for Unsolved Violent Crimes (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
department-justice-announces-interim-policy-emerging-method-generate-leads-unsolvedviolent [https://perma.cc/C2FU-MYPN].
215 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 6192.3; CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH
POLICY, supra note 88, at 3–4.
216 CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY, supra note 88, at 2.
217 The New York regulations on familial searching require that the forensic
profile be “searched against DNA profiles in the DNA databank’s offender index.”
§ 6192.3(h)(3)(iv). However, prior to the use of investigative genealogy searches, law
enforcement should first be required to determine if there are any CODIS-based familial
matches before turning to the genealogy database to look for relatives.
218 See § 6192.3(h)(3); see also CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY, supra note 88, at
2; SWGDAM RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118.
219 § 6192.3(j)(1).
220 § 6192.3(j)(2).
221 See § 6192.3(j).
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to take further traditional investigative measures, including but
not limited to: making a family tree; conducting background
checks; reviewing any court or prison records; and re-evaluating
evidence previously collected in association with the crime to
determine the likelihood that any candidate is the perpetrator.222
Additionally, the results of a genealogy search must be released
in writing and include a statement indicating that the results
should be used for law enforcement purposes only, and serve
merely as an investigative lead—not as an indication of identity
or as a “definitive statement of familial (i.e., biological)
relationships.”223 Finally, if a suspect is identified through a
genealogy search and further investigation, law enforcement
must take the extra step of collecting and directly comparing the
suspect’s DNA profile to the forensic profile recovered from the
crime scene.224 This provision ensures that no individual is
arrested before it has been confirmed that the forensic profile
collected from the crime scene matches the suspect’s profile.
These requirements will ensure that investigators do not
“follow the genetic leads at the expense of more traditional
leads”225 in an attempt to sidestep search warrant and other due
process requirements. The proposed framework encourages
genealogists and law enforcement to scour public records,
obituaries, census data and much more to further develop their
investigation. 226 Investigative genealogy searches do not hinder
traditional investigative tools; rather, such searches provide a
lead to enhance customary methods of police investigations.
Genealogy websites offer a wealth of data that can assist
in achieving incredibly important public safety goals,227 but
Congress should enact a statutory framework, similar to the one
laid out above, to balance these goals with protecting individual
privacy rights.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court reiterated in Maryland v. King what it
has stated historically: “The reasonableness of any search must be
See CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY, supra note 88, at 3.
§ 6192.3(k)(2); see also CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY, supra note 88, at 2.
224 CBI FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY, supra note 88, at 4.
225 Suter, supra note 24, at 386.
226 See Heather Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case. Here’s
What She’s Going to Do Next, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
08/29/science/barbara-rae-venter-gsk.html [https://perma.cc/CPE5-XU5H] (noting the use
of public records and print and online media resources in supplementing investigative
genealogy searches).
227 Suter, supra note 24, at 373.
222
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considered in the context of the person’s legitimate expectations of
privacy.”228 The government has a strong interest in locating
violent criminals and bringing victims justice. But, this interest
cannot be accomplished at the cost of invading individuals’ privacy
rights. This note’s proposed statute balances these concerns by
serving both interests. It permits investigative genealogy searches,
but only when specific protective measures have been met.
Applying the conditions laid out above, investigative genealogy
searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment balancing
test, as sincere privacy and ethical concerns are outweighed by a
legitimate government interest in public safety, as well as the
societal benefits reaped by apprehending perpetrators of serious
crimes. Outside of such cases, though, the government should not
be barking up an individual’s family tree.
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